




Betvteen 1650 and 1780, about 650 mostly young men were convicted of bes-
tiality and executed in Sweden, together with hundreds of cows, mares, and other 
animals (Liliequist 1990). What today would be regarded as relatively harmless ex-
periments with youthful sexuality in the context of a rural adolescent subculture 
was in those days perceived as a capital offense: a sin against the natural, sacred or-
der of God's creation, a demonic transgression of the sacrosanct human-animal 
boundary. When Carolus Linnaeus, the eighteenth-century Swedish naturalist, 
classified humans together with apes in the same anatomical order, that of the An-
thropomorpha or Primates, and included a nonhuman primate in the genus 1-lomo, 
he did something similar. Other naturalists took offense at the unprecedented rap-
prochement of human and beast in the various editions of Systema na/tArae, even 
though Linnaeus repeatedly stressed that, notwithstanding all morphological sim-
ilarities, their invisible, reasonable soul put humans high above animals. 
Apes are the most prominent inhabitants of the borderland between human and 
beast in Western imagination. They are the animals perceived to be closest to hu-
mans. In ancient times it was because of their general human-like appearance; 
since the seventeenth cenrury it was because of specific anatomical similarities to 
humans; in the eighteenth century, as weU as in recent decades, it has been because 
of their presumed linguistic capacities (Wokler 1995). Since the nineteenth cen-
tury, it has been because of evolutionary reasons. Recently discovered biochemi-
cal similarities, as well as the understanding that nonhuman primates are also tool-
makers and capable of deceiving others, have strengthened the perception of 
affinity (e.g., Corbey 1 996). 
This chapter explores some episodes of the complex and fascinating struggle 
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concerning the status of human and nonhum:m primates that has taken place since 
Linnaeus, in various sciences as well as in Western cultural imagination in general, 
thus providing some historical and intellectual background to recent discussions 
on the moral status of the great apes (Cavelieri and Singer 1994). The history of 
scientific approaches to primates since the eighteenth century is characterized by 
an enormous increase in empirical knowledge pertaining to their systematics, evo-
lution, genetics, ecology, behavior, and cognition. But at the same time it is, as we 
shall see, a permanent struggle with the most significant, most heavily tabooed di-
viding line within nature; an enduring activity of negotiating-drawing, deny-
ing, policing, bridging, displacing-the metaphysical, religious, and moral bound-
ary between humans and their closest relatives in nature. Indeed, an alternation of 
humanizing and bestializing moves with respect to both apes and humans. 
THE APE'S ESSENCE 
In the mid-eighteenth century, Linnaeus was the first to rank humans emphati-
cally with other primates in the many editions of his authoritative Systema natu-
rae. The reactions provoked by that act reveal the preoccupation, and its basis, of 
most of his contemporaries with human distinctiveness and dignity. Johan Georg 
Gmelin fi·om Petersburg, for one, immediately challenged the inclusion of human 
among the Anthropomorpha, pointing to Genesis 1 :26ff: Humans are imago Dei, 
the only living being created in the image of God (Gmelin 1746/ 1976). Gmelin, 
Wallerius, Klein, Hailer, and Pennant all disagreed with Linnaeus. In his Histoire 
Nature/le de l'Homme, BuJfon in Paris pointed to the divine breath that penetrates 
the human body and, following Descartes, conceived of humans as H. duplex: con-
sisting of a body that is similar to that of the brute apes but also consisting of mind, 
which is a unique feature, connected with the faculty of speech (Leclerc de Buf-
fon 1749). To confi1se a human with a beast, one must be as poorly enlightened 
as a beast, he sneered, probably also against Jean-Jacques Rousseau, among others, 
who saw anthropoid apes as some sort of natural man, as humans in their "natural 
state," in principle capable of speech (Rousseau 1755). 
Blumenbach in Gottingen, Germany, then split the order of the Primates es-
tablished by Linnaeus into t\vo, getting rid of the uncomfortable closeness of hu-
man and ape. Humans belonged in the separate biological order of two-handed 
Bimanus, not in that of the four-handed Quadrumana, he claimed (Blumenbach 
1776). This had to do with a new approach to classification, taking not only mor-
phology but also functions, corresponding to the Creator's intentions, into ac-
count: Our grasping hands and upright gait set humans apart; we were designed 
to stand and walk upright. The preoccupation with human uniqueness was a guid-
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ing principle of Blumenbach's natural history of humans, which, as he wrote in a 
letter to Hailer in 1775, set out "to defend the rights of mankind and to contest 
the ridiculous association with the true ape" (Dougherty 1984, 64-66). 
Despite this criticism, Linnaeus's natural history was, if anything, Christian sci-
ence; a scientia divina. Linnaeus was an orthodox Lutheran and almost certainly 
agreed when Hailer in 1746, in a review of Linnaeus's Fa11na Succica, called him a 
second Adam naming the animals, even though that was meant sarcastically (von 
Hailer 1787 I 1971). Linnaeus saw nature as God's creation, a strictly ordered, im-
mensely diverse hierarchy or scale of beings, with humans on top, and it was his 
sacred mission, he believed, to reconstruct and codify that order. 
In the Christian cosmology that was constitutive for much of eighteenth-
century natural history, humans were seen as imago Dei, the only creature created 
in God's own image: As H. dominator, it is immediately added in Genesis 1:2 8, hu-
mans have dominion over the rest of nature, including animals and apes. The then-
predOJninant view of apes was still close to the medieval icon of simia .figura dia-
boli-the hideous, frivolous monkey as the image of the devil. The Christian view 
of the world, taking the ontologies of Plato and Aristotle into account, explains 
structure and change in nature in terms of eternal, immutable essences, called souls 
in the case of living beings. Only humans have rational souls, and that constitutes 
their essence (essentia) and "essential" difference from apes. The influence of this 
Christian metaphysics of apes on eighteenth-century natural history converged 
with that of seventeenth-century rationalist, Cartesian philosophy, which held hu-
mans to be the only being possessing reason, thus keeping up the human-animal 
boundary. 
There was yet another source of unfavorable views of animals in general and 
nonhuman primates in particular, in addition to Judeo-Christian cosmology, 
Greek ontology, and modern rationalism. Modern European citizens looked on 
themselves as "civilized" persons and acted as such, behaving, dressing, eating, 
defecating, making love, and so on, in a proper, "civilized" manner. In this con-
text, animals and their "uncontrolled," "beastly" behavior provided models of how 
not to behave and were associated by citizens with their own "beastly" bodies and 
bodily functions, which a" civilized" person was to keep under control. Europeans 
thus articulated their own identity in terms of the exemplary otherness of unciv-
ilized animals: We are not like them. Monkeys especially, because of their am-
biguous, uncanny similarity to humans, provided a prominent model of undesir-
able otherness in European culture (see Corbey 1994). 
These various backgrounds converged, as they still do today, to a strictly drawn 
theoretical, moral, and practical human-animal boundary. Given these back-
grounds, we begin to understand why eighteenth-century Europeans reacted so 
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severely to rural youngsters playing sexual games with cattle or even to natural his-
torians associating humans closely with other primates. 
APE ANCESTRY 
The replacement of the idea of eternally fixed essences of species by that of trans-
mutation by random variation and selective retention implied that humans de-
scended from apelike ancestors. Indeed, as in the preceding centuries the great apes 
were gradually discovered and ultimately distinguished from one another in the 
context of worldwide trade and the expansion of European nation states, so from 
the mid-nineteenth century onward a long series of early h01ninids were discov-
ered: Neanderthals in Europe and H. erecttiS in Indonesia, followed by several 
species of australopithecines and H. habilis in Africa, among others. How did these 
discoveries affect how Europeans saw themselves, apes, and the rest of nature? 
Again, human and ape were brought in painfully dose association, closer even 
than in Linnaeus's time, because of a postulated genealogical link. Just as in the 
case of Linnaeus, Charles Darwin himself was the first to worry about this new 
challenge to traditional European cosmology, threatening to turn it upside down. 
A remark jotted in his notebooks in 1838, "The Devil under form of baboon is 
our Grandfather" (Barrett and Gautrey 1987, 128), reminds of the medievalsimia 
figt~ra diaboli icon, and in a letter to Joseph Hooker, Darwin referred to the evolu-
tionist view of nature as that of "a Devil's Chaplain" (Desmond and Moo re 1992, 
449). His concern for human dignity and fear for his own reputation as a God-
fearing and law-abiding citizen made him postpone dealing explicitly with hu-
man descent until 1871, when he published The Descent cif Man. 
How intensely Darwin wrestled with the problem of human's place in nature, 
not just biologically but also in a metaphysical and moral sense, is evident from 
many ambiguous as well as ambivalent passages in that book. "Man may be ex-
cused," he wrote ar the end, "from feeling some pride at having risen ... to the 
very summit of the organic scale; and the fact of his having thus risen, instead of 
having been aboriginaUy placed there, may give him hope for a still higher des-
tiny in the distant future." Despite his "god-like intellect" (the ima,~o Dei idea again) 
and other noble qualities, "man still bears in his bodily frame the indelible stamp 
of his lowly origin" (Darwin 1877, 619). In a similar vein, Thomas Huxley, one 
of Darwin's close supporters, stipulated that our "reverence for the nobility of 
manhood v.;ill not be lessened by the knowledge that man is, in substance and 
structure, one with the brutes" (Huxley 1863, 112). Because of that structural, 
evolutionary unity with brute animals Huxley reinstated the Linnaean primate or-
der that had been split by Blumenbach. 
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Like Linnaeus in another context, the evolutionists were confi-onted with con-
temporaries who, like themselves, perceived the threat to human dignity posed by 
the "grim and grotesque procession" of ape ancestors, in the Duke of Argyll's 
words (Argyll 1868), but dealt differently with that menace in the context of their 
interpretations of biological data. One of those contemporaries was the anatomist, 
Richard Owen, well-versed in German holistic and teleological Nat11rphilosophie, 
for whom not just the spiritual but also the morphological separation of human 
and ape was a moral and metaphysical imperative during the whole of his career. 
In search of an anatomical feature that would perm.it a classification with humans 
apart, not just in a different order but in a different subclass at the head of cre-
ation, Owen (1857) proclaimed the hippocampus minor, a lobe of the brain, to 
be such a feature, unique to humans; Huxley, however, proved him wrong (Hux-
ley 1861). 
Impending apes and apemen were successfully kept at a distance by casting the 
newly discovered evolutionary process as a progress toward humanness, epitomized 
by European middle-class civilization, as its apex and natural goal-a widespread 
conviction toward the end of the nineteenth century. In this temporalized form, 
the traditional idea of a moral hierarchy of creatures with humans on top lingered. 
The question posed by Benjamin Disraeli in a speech in O>:ford in 1864, "Is man 
an ape or an angel?", answered by h.im with, "My Lord, I am on the side of the 
angels" (quoted in Monypenny and Buckle 1929) now came to be generally de-
cided in favor of apes. That "yes" to apes, however, was a "yes, but ... ," because 
apish ancestors were kept at arm's length, together with apes and apish "contem-
porary ancestors," by situating them only at the beginning of the ascent toward hu-
manness. 
Apish, monstrous others loom large in many scientific, Uterary, and political 
writings fi·om around the turn of the twentieth century. Early hominids, great 
apes, humans from prestate societies, or indeed one's political opponents were 
quite consistently depicted as unable to restrain their beastly impulses, as prone to 
violence, rape, incest, and cannibalism, again epitomizing uncivilized otherness. 
The Darwinian perception of nature as red in tooth and claw, a struggle for life in 
a quite literal sense, supported the image of primeval, wild, apish otherness, to be 
subdued by civilized control. 
THE BEAST WITHIN 
Not much later, an unrestrained animal other surfaced in one of the most influ-
ential views of human behavior, psychology, and culture of the twentieth century: 
psychoanalysis. As a Lamarckian, and under the influence of Ernst Haeckel's "bio-
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genetic law" or "principle of recapitulation," Sigmund Freud held the harsh ex-
periences of primeval humans to be constitutive of present-day human souls. 
Among those experiences, according to him, were primal patricides and incestu-
ous sexual desire, giving rise to, among other things, the Oedipus complex, neu-
rosis, religious behavior, and the characteristic behavior of crowds. "Incest, canni-
balism and the lust for killing," he wrote in The Future of an Illusion, are "born 
afresh with every child" (Freud 1961; cf. Corbey 1991). Neurosis especially was a 
so-called atavism, a regression, not just ontogenetically but also phylogenetically, 
and Freud believed the behavior of neurotics, early humans, contemporary "prim-
itives," and modern children to be comparable with respect to the role of "prim-
itive" impulsiveness and a deficient sense of reality. 
Civilization, in this view, is possible only by taming human's dark, ineradicable 
animal nature, by domesticating the beast within. Human behavior is the outcome 
of a struggle bet:ween civilized control, exercised by society through the child's 
real or internalized parents, and wild primeval impulses. Freud, an avid reader of 
the evolutionist anthropology of his day, concluded his 1915 discussion of the phe-
nomenon of war with the statement that "[in] this respect, as in many others, the 
man of prehistoric times survives unchanged in our unconscious" (Freud 1957, 
296). In the psychoanalytic conception of human nature, one of the clearest ex-
amples of an articulation of human identity in terms of animal otherness, the 
human-animal boundary is drawn within ourselves; the encroaching primeval 
beast within has to be controlled and humanized. 
The "beast-in-man," usually depicted as apelike and to some extent an avatar of 
earlier, Platonic, Pauline, and Protestant dualistic views of human nature, is a force-
ful, omnipresent metaphor in the twentieth century, depicting human nature be-
fore, or deprived of, culture. King Kong in the 1933 film classic is close to what 
this beastly other was imagined to look like, and similar apelike monsters popped 
up in f.1scist anti-Communist propaganda and Communist antifascist propaganda. 
Many pictorial or literary descriptions of early hominids and great apes during the 
first half of the twentieth century presented the same image and were inspired by 
the same master narrative of an ascent toward humanness. 
FROM IGNOBLE TO NOBLE? 
Since the 1960s, the rapid expansion of research on many aspects of nonhuman 
primates, not least their social life and cognition, did much to change the pre-
dominantly negative image of the generalized apish other in Western imagination, 
a change that parallels that from a Hobbesian to a Rousseauesque perception of 
the "natural state" of humankind two centuries earlier. The well-known photo-
graph where young Jane Goodall and a chimpanzee reach their pointing fingers 
R. CORBEY " 169 
toward each other, repeated by Dian Fossey and by actress Sigourney Weaver play-
ing her in a successful film on Fossey's research among mountain gorillas (Gorillas 
in the Mist), sums it up neatly: This was a highly symbolic gesture, explicitly aimed 
at bridging the human-animal boundary. These apes were cast as happy rather than 
brutish beasts, living in relative harmony with their kin in an East African Eden 
instead of having to survive in the harsh jungle. The regular occurrence of vio-
lence among chimpanzees, discovered more recently, was a crack in that particu-
lar mirror for Western humans. 
The well-known work of primatologist Frans de Waal revealed the complexity 
of social and political behavior among nonhuman primates and its close similar-
ity to that of humans with respect to aggression, reciprocal altruism, and mecha-
nisms of conflict control (de Waal 1982). It helped to combat the widespread in-
clination of seeing our bad habits as exclusively animal and our good ones as 
exclusively human. De Waal increasingly stressed that apes are basically Good Na-
tured (de Waal 1996), as the title of his 1996 book has it, both on a technical, sci-
entific, and philosophical level. His interpretations of Peace-Making among Primates 
(de Waal 1989) in terms of concepts normally used for humans, such as politics, 
friendship, empathy, and forgiveness, have not gone uncriticized, although at least 
some of the reproach of anthropomorphism would seem to be another expres-
sion of the anthropocentric concern with human uniqueness that has accompa-
nied the study of nonhuman primates since Linnaeus. 
Harvard primatologist Richard Wrangham's Hobbesian approach to primates is 
diametrically opposed to de Waal's stress on peacemaking. His 1996 book on De-
monic .Males, written for a large audience in cooperation with Dale Peterson, em-
phasizes male violence and aggression as pivotal survival strategies: Males are 
selected by females for exploitive and aggressive behaviors, leading to competitive 
success. "We are cursed," Wranghan1 and Peterson wrote, "with a demonic male 
temperament and a Machiavellian capacity to express it," a "5-million years stain 
of our ape past" (Wrangham and Petersen 1996, 258). It should be added, how-
ever, that both Wrangham and Peterson's Demonic Males and de Waal's Good Na-
tured have been received with mixed feelings by primatologists and anthropolo-
gists. 
Although since the 1960s there has been a shift toward generally more positive 
views of nonhuman primates, small-scale non-Western peoples, and early ho-
minids, the total picture is more complex. A Hobbesian perception of human and 
primate nature persisted in certain tendencies in the work of ethologists and so-
ciobiologists, and, in a sense, in Richard Dawkins's "selfish genes" metaphor, ex-
plaining altruism as a form of selfishness on a more basic level. Feminist paleoan-
thropologists and primatologists, on the other hand, counterbalanced the "man 
the aggressive hunter" approach with a new, "woman the peaceful gatherer" re-
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search paradigm in the 1970s. This added to a tendency appearing at about the 
same time to depict early hominids as happy families in peaceful East African land-
scapes, replacing the monstrous primeval apemen of earlier generations, armed 
with clubs and struggling violently for survival. 
Remarkably, violence and peacefulness as interpretive viewpoints, in scientific 
research as well as on the level of popular imagination, have an analogous role to 
play in ethnography. Traditionally, violence has been one of the main ascribed 
characteristics of non-Western humans, often perceived as apish "lower races" or 
"contemporary ancestors," and nonhuman primates alike. Both categories were 
seen as primitive, brute, and unrestrained and associated with the savage begin-
nings of humankind's progress to civilization. The shifting balance of negative and 
positive views of primates in recent decades is quite parallel to characterizations, 
during that same period, of certain peoples as explicitly aggressive and fierce or, 
alternatively, unambiguously gentle and peaceful. 
Combining insights fi·om sociobiology with cultural materialist ones, the an-
thropologist Napoleon Chagnon, for example, in his research on the Amazonia 
Yanomami, stresses the inclusive fitness of male warriors in the complex interre-
lationship between individuals, groups, and their natural environment: The more 
women they have access to, the better the proliferation of their genes (Chagnon 
1997). This picture of the Yanomami as vengeful aggressors, beating up women 
and warring constantly, has been criticized as at least one-sided, and the Chewong 
and Semai Senoi from Malaysia, as well as the Sakkudei from Indonesia, have been 
thrown in the balance as decisively peaceful peoples (e.g., Howell and Willis 1989). 
Comparable shifts took place in views of the Kalahari Desert !Kung. Although 
they used to be regarded as one of the most primitive and lamentable races of hu-
mankind, slotted between Caucasian humans and the "lowly" apes, they came to 
be hailed as gentle and harmless "noble savages," who, unlike Western humans, 
lived in close harmony with one another and with nature. Here too a crack ap-
peared in the mirror, just like in the case of the chimpanzees, when their high 
homicide rates were pointed out by biologically orientated authors. Something 
similar happened to Margaret Mead's 19? 8 idyllic portrayal of Coming of A.i?e in 
Samoa: Her underestimation of the role of jealousy, abuse, rape, and violence in 
the life of adolescents in Samoa was criticized as a culturalist bias by, again, a bio-
logically orientated anthropologist (Freeman 1983). 
ENCROACHING APES 
Although speech has traditionally been seen as the outward appearance of mind, 
a faculty unique to humans, research on the linguistic abilities of bonobos and 
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other apes has undermined the idea of H. loquens, humans as the only animal ca-
pable of language, closely linked with two other pervasive human self-definitions, 
that of H. symbolicus and that of H. sapiens. Self-recognition of their reflections by 
chimpanzees and dolphins also suggested similarity to the mind of humans, as did 
studies on tactical deception by nonhuman primates (e.g., Parker, MitcheU, and 
Bocca 1994). 
The notion of a chasm between symbolic human culture and the rest of the 
living world is another instance of the human-animal boundary. In the eyes of 
many, if not most, anthropologists, that notion lies at the foundation of cultural 
anthropology as a discipline, serving to legitimize its autonomy with regard to the 
biological sciences, including physical anthropology. Learned, arbitrary, and vari-
able symbolic meaning imposed on the environment was, and still is, held to set 
humans apart, and therefore requires a special methodology and indeed special/m-
man sciences. "Believing ... that nun is an animal suspended in webs of signifi-
cance he has himself spun," wrote an influential cultural anthropologist, Clifford 
Geertz, giving voice to this conviction, "I take culture to be those webs, and the 
analysis of it to be therefore not an experimental science in search of law but an 
interpretive one in search of meaning" (Geertz 1973, 5). 
Sociobiology and behavioral ecology, on the other hand, start from an assump-
tion that is diametrically opposed to the H. symbo/ims view of anthropologists: the 
uniformity of all behaving organisms, including humans. The attempts of these 
disciplines to deal with complex human behavior in the same way as with that of 
other primates and other animals n'let with furious resistance fl-om cultural an-
thropologists. In their introduction to the volume they edited on Understanding 
Behavior: fVhat Primate Studies Tell Us about H11man Behavior (1991), James Loy and 
Calvin Peters complained about the fundamental reluctance of the human sci-
ences to give serious attention to behavioral data from animals, or to take an evo-
lutionary approach, a reluctance that is a direct corollary of their disciplinary iden-
tity. Everybody who has worked in an anthropology department will in some way 
have experienced the divergence bet\veen (physical) anthropologists who do and 
(cultural) anthropologists who do not think primate studies can teU us much about 
human behavior and culture. 
Homo Jaber, "human as toolmaker," was a widespread human self-definition. 
When in the early 1960s archaeologist Louis Leakey heard that his pupil Jane 
Goodall had discovered tool use among chimpanzees in Tanzania, he reportedly 
remarked that now the notion of tool had to be redefined, or that of human, or 
else chimpanzees had to be accepted as human (Cole 1975). In an influential 1969 
article titled, "Culture: A Human Domain," anthropologist Ralph Holloway 
claimed the imposition of arbitrary form on the environment to be "specific and 
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unique to human behavior" and to be identifiable by the appearance of stone tools 
in the archaeological record (Holloway 1969). Paleoanthropologist Ian Tattersall 
complained as recently as 1994 about the "power of toolmaking to mesmerize pa-
leoanthropologists into classifying the makers of any stone tools, however crude, 
in the genus Homo" (Tattersall1994). However, much has been discovered on tool 
use and cultural traditions in nonhuman species since the 1960s, and Pan the tool-
maker now stands side by side with Homo toolmakers. 
REBUTTED AGAIN 
For some, such discoveries pertaining to the linguistic, cognitive, and technolog-
ical abilities of animals, especially nonhuman primates, have further problematized 
the human-animal boundary as it was traditionally drawn, whereas for others it 
has necessitated fortifying that boundary by redefining it. Chimpanzees may use 
symbols, the latter group say, but we should not just look for symbols but for syn-
tactically ordered symbols; and even if they have syntax, do they use it to be re-
flexive about language, like we do? They may use tools, they say, but we should 
not just look for tools but for tools made with tools; they may have cultural tradi-
tions in the sense of intergenerationally transmitted, learned solutions to prob-
lems, but should we not look for the transmission of symbolic meaning? 
Matt Cartmill, a physical anthropologist himself, has sharply criticized the per-
sistent anthropological focus on human uniqueness as the phenomenon to be ex-
plained. Such supposedly unique human features as large brains, language, con-
ceptual thinking, and upright bipedalism, he wrote, 
are uniquely human by definition rather than as a matter of empirical fact. Much scien-
tific effort and ingenuity has gone into redefining such characteristics whenever discov-
eries about other animals have posed a threat to human uniqueness. (Cartmill 1990, 173) 
Cartmill elaborated on a string of examples from his own field, physical an-
thropology. The uniquely large human brain, by anthropocentric definition, for 
example, came under attack several times. The much larger brains of elephants and 
whales were dealt with by shifting the criterion to brain size relative to body size. 
Unfortunately, according to that criterion, humans are surpassed by squirrels and 
other small animals, so a new one was proposed that was corrected for allometry. 
That move brought porpoises uncomfortably close, a threat to human uniqueness 
that again was neutralized by taking metabolic rates into account (Cartmill 1990). 
The fallacy is assuming that the human form of a particular characteristic is its 
defining feature and the privileged standard against which to judge all species. The 
; 
R. CORBEY 0 173 
same fallacy is shown by Barbara King to be present in much work on the evolu-
tion of intergenerationa1 information transmission and language, where, as she 
shows, language precursors are typically sought in a human-oriented way (King 
1994, especially chap. 6). Such strategies, once again, keep apes at a comfortable 
distante, even in recent scientific research. 
APES AND METAPHYSICS 
There is more than one sense in which one can speak of the metaphysics of apes. 
Primarily they are important characters, exemplary others, in the grand meta-
physical narratives and articulations of human identity in Western tradition. Over 
the past few decades, philosophy of science has become very aware of the fact that 
n1etaphysical or ontological assumptions are to be found in the very core of the-
oretical approaches in natural sciences as well as human sciences. Such usually im-
plicit but very basic conceptual presuppositions are germane not only to discipli-
nary identity but also to concrete interpretations of data. When interpreting data 
in primatology, human origin studies, or research on the evolution of language 
and cognition, for example, much depends on how we conceive of language, species, 
or intention. 
In that second sense, "metaphysics of apes" refers to ontological assumptions 
that structure our scientific approaches to human and nonhuman primates, their 
evolution, behavior, communication, and minds (see Corbey 1998). Such as-
sumptions are predicated on the metaphysics of apes in the first sense: the way in 
which traditional Western religion and philosophy, Aristotelian, Cartesian, Kant-
ian, phenomenological, hermeneutic, and so on, conceived of nonhuman pri-
mates. A third sense of the phrase, finally, that is relevant in this context is "meta-
physics" in the sense of the views apes themselves have of the world, of morals, of 
us, of themselves. 
Although ontological assumptions have a role to play in all scientific approaches, 
be it Linnean systematics, linguistics, or behavioral ecology, we should, in my opin-
ion, be careful not to judge the history of our scientific dealings with nonhuman 
primates too quickly and simplistically in terms of a progress from, as one well-
known anthropologist once put it, a data-poor and nonsense-rich era to a more 
sophisticated, data-rich era. The foregoing anthology from that history shows no 
such unequivocal progress, but, if anything, the persistence of metaphysics in the 
core of scientific theories. There are now, as there always have been, enormous 
differences "in the preconceptions, assumptions, and biases that different workers 
[bring] to bear on the resolution of problems that, on the surface at least, were 
thought to be held in common," as the editors of a volume on such preconccp-
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tions in the field of human origins studies say (Clark and Will er met 1997, 1; cf. 
Corbey and Roebroeks 2001). Such differences can at times be so vast as to pre-
clude any common basis for discussion. 
Analogously, there is no easy way of disqualifying scientific approaches that keep 
apes at a distance as somehow less scientific than those that stress continuities. 
Much of the scientific resistance against the idea of linguistic competence in apes, 
for example, is very sophisticated methodologically. Defenders of the idea of ape 
language, on the other hand, adhere to approaches that are as refined but take a 
difterent, often more hermeneutic or interpretive, view of what language is. 
MOVING BEYOND 
We have seen how the sacrosanct traditional markers of humanness, as an onto-
logical and as a moral category, were compromised and redefined time and again, 
not only by rural Swedish youngsters but also, showing that science is also culture 
and metaphysics, by natural historians, by human scientists, and by linguists. Hu-
man identity was at stake and was defended against apes and apishness. Catego-
rizing the living world was a means of keeping other animals at a distance and 
functioned as an ideological justification of human behaviors toward them (Cor-
bey 1997). Such categorizations were, and still are, embedded in grand metaphys-
ical narratives that install moral hierarchies or the still forceful remnants of such 
narratives: that of God and His creation, or, alternatively, that of the ascent of hu-
mans, or at least certain humans, beyond the animality of their apish ancestors to-
ward "civilization" and true humanness. 
The very idea of essential difference, although abandoned by twentieth-century 
biology, still pervades much ofWestern thought, laws (see chapter 15, this volume) 
and practices, inextricably connected with the traditional metaphysical view that 
species have eternal, immutable, discrete essences that form a moral hierarchy. Next 
to a growing awareness of our intimate connections with other apes, the preoc-
cupation with an unambiguous, pure human identity persists, as does the rebuttal 
of whatever may contaminate that purity. Essentialism and anthropocentrism as 
avatars of the Western metaphysical tradition are reinforced by our commonsense 
habit of perceiving the world in terms of a moral order of clear-cut natural kinds, 
the integrity of which is not to be tinkered with by, for example, gene transfer or 
organ transplantation between animals and humans, cloning organisms, or indeed 
classifying nonhuman and human primates too closely together. 
It may be time to move from drawing to bridging the boundary between hu-
mans and the rest of nature more definitely, by thinking against the grain of most 
of Western tradition and cultural attitudes, not necessarily as a definitive persua-
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sion but as a move our era calls for, a morally relevant gesture of soEdarity toward 
fellow beings who may thus play a new role: that of missing links between hu-
mans and the rest of nature. A sharp insight into the traditional, anthropocentric 
metaphysics of apes that still inspires much of human dealings with them, in so-
ciety arid in science, is indispensable in that context. 
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